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SUMMARY: This paper investigates managers’ economic incentives for voluntary re-
porting on risk management and internal control using a sample of publicly traded ﬁrms
in The Netherlands in the late 1990s. In this particular setting, internal control reporting
was voluntary and covered a wide business-based approach as deﬁned in key internal
control frameworks. We create an index to measure the extent of disclosure by iden-
tifying six reportable items related to internal control. Regarding managers’ incentives
to report, we hypothesize that voluntary disclosure increases with the extent of infor-
mation and agency problems, as proxied by management and block holder ownership
and ﬁnancial leverage. Supporting our hypotheses, we ﬁnd a negative relationship be-
tween the extent of internal control disclosure and management and block holder own-
ership, and positive relationship between the extent of disclosure and ﬁnancial lever-
age. We interpret these ﬁndings as evidence for a conscious trade-off by managers,
which is linked to the costs and beneﬁts of making internal control disclosures. Addi-
tionally, we ﬁnd some evidence that the extent of disclosure varies with ﬁrms’ inherent
risk exposure, as proxied by a number of ﬁrm operating characteristics. One implication
of our ﬁndings is that regulators may wish to allow ﬁrms ﬂexibility in their internalcontrol
reporting choice, as ﬁrms take a broad approach to internal control that goes beyond
SOX-based regulations, and tailor their internal control reports to suit their speciﬁc
environments.
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INTRODUCTION
I
n the summer of 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (U.S. House
of Representatives 2002) in response to numerous perceived failures in corporate gov-
ernance and ﬁnancial reporting. The Act established the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) and imposed detailed governance and reporting requirements
for companies with public listings in the U.S. A critical element of the new law was a
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requirement that companies issue audited reports on the quality of internal control over
ﬁnancial reporting as subsequently detailed in Auditing Standards No. 2 (PCAOB 2004).
While this development would seem to have settled the debate over reporting on internal
control, in some ways it has made the issue even more salient and controversial. First, the
perspective on internal control adopted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and Auditing
Standards No. 2 is extremely narrow and focuses entirely on ﬁnancial reporting. Previously
existing frameworks for evaluating internal control, such as COSO (1992), COCO (1995),
and the Turnbull Report (1999), considered internal control to encompass a much broader
range of risks and controls that would be of interest to external stakeholders. Second, other
than U.S. publicly listed companies, most other jurisdictions and markets continue to adopt
a broader view of internal control when issuing guidance for best practices and reporting
(IFAC 2006). IFAC (2006, 14) observes that ‘‘Section 404 is the product of the U.S. reg-
ulatory framework which, to some extent, is unique in that it is usually characterized as
being rules-based. The approach in many other jurisdictions has tended to be principles-
based and market-led. This alternative approach has recently been endorsed in the U.K.,
Europe, and Hong Kong.’’ Thus, an alternative and widely held view of internal control
incorporates a broad perspective that includes managing strategic, operational, and com-
pliance risk, in addition to ﬁnancial reporting risk.
In this paper, we examine the conditions under which a ﬁrm is likely to voluntarily
report on risk management and internal control. Bronson et al. (2006) report some evidence
regarding the incentive effects of voluntary internal control reporting in the U.S. prior to
SOX, but they restrict their analysis to internal controls consistent with SOX, i.e., controls
‘‘designed to only provide reasonable assurance as to the accuracy of ﬁnancial statements’’
(27). In contrast, we examine a setting where voluntary reporting on internal control covers
a much wider business-based approach as deﬁned by COSO (1992) or Turnbull (1999). We
speciﬁcally choose a period prior to SOX because the economic motivation for reporting
is driven more by the natural economic incentives of management and boards than regu-
lation. Furthermore, we focus on a low regulation environment (The Netherlands) since our
goal is to examine managers’economic incentives for voluntary reporting on internal control
in the broadest sense. The Netherlands provides an excellent environment to test economic
incentives because its market dynamics are very similar to the U.S. and U.K. The impli-
cations are also relevant to the wider business community and regulators since the current
regulatory environment applies to only a small subset of controls (internal controls over
ﬁnancial reporting) in a single market segment (U.S. registrants).
More speciﬁcally, we address the following question: Do managers in a low-regulation
environment voluntarily report on risk management and internal control to reduce the ef-
ﬁciency loss of information and agency problems? We argue that the extent of internal
control disclosure increases with the extent of information risk and agency problems be-
cause it enables investors to better monitor management. Our analysis is based on a dis-
closure index that measures the extent of voluntary reporting on internal control for a
sample of ﬁrms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange during the period 1997–1999.
While national and international best practice frameworks recommended internal control
reporting in the 1990s (e.g., COSO 1992; Turnbull 1999), there was no legal obligation to
report on internal control (or explain the lack of such reporting) at the time. Thus, any such
reporting can be considered to be ‘‘at will’’ and reﬂective of economic and agency incen-
tives. Furthermore, since SOX did not exist and the existing relevant control frameworks
were broadly speciﬁed, we are able to look at control reporting at the business and entity-
wide level, not just for ﬁnancial reporting. Finally, because ownership structures and the
incentives for shareholders to actively monitor managers vary widely in The NetherlandsEconomic Incentives for Voluntary Internal Control Reporting 37
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(De Jong et al. 2001), we are able to study ﬁrms with diffuse ownership, which resemble
typical U.S. ﬁrms, and ﬁrms with more concentrated ownership, which are common in
many other parts of the world.
Our analysis reveals strong evidence that economic incentives for voluntary internal
control reporting exist in a low regulation environment. More speciﬁcally, we provide ev-
idence that managers voluntarily report more (less) on internal control if information prob-
lems and agency conﬂicts are higher (lower). We interpret this to reﬂect a conscious trade-
off by managers which is linked to the costs and beneﬁts of making these disclosures. As
this issue is re-examined in the future, other countries or regulators may expand either the
coverage of such reporting or the market segments to which they apply (FEE 2005), in
which case it is important to understand the incentives for such reporting when regulatory
intervention is relatively light. One implication of our ﬁndings is that regulators may wish
to allow ﬁrms some ﬂexibility in their internal control reporting choices as ﬁrms tailor these
reports to suit their speciﬁc environments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section provides a brief
background and discusses prior research. The third section outlines the theoretical frame-
work and develops the hypotheses. The fourth and ﬁfth sections present the research design
and results, respectively. The ﬁnal section summarizes the results, discusses certain limi-
tations, and considers potential implications of the study.
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH
Policy Reports
Internal control has received a great deal of attention over the past decades. In the U.S.,
the attention took the form of improved guidance on developing and implementing internal
control as evidenced by the COSO report (COSO 1992).1 In the U.K., the Cadbury report
(1992a, 1992b) and the Hampel Committee (1998a, 1998b) also focused on internal control,
including suggestions for public reporting to outside parties. In The Netherlands, the Peters
Committee (1997), followed by the Tabaksblat Committee (2003), developed a number of
recommendations regarding the role of the supervisory board in monitoring internal control.
In a recent overview, IFAC (2006) summarizes the current work on internal controls across
the globe. They speciﬁcally cite reports prepared in the U.K. (FRC 2005), the U.S. (COSO
2004), Europe (FEE 2005), Hong Kong (HKICPA 2005), South Africa (King Committee
2002), and The Netherlands (Tabaksblat Committee 2003). In general, IFAC observed that
‘‘the majority of [reports] on internal control have agreed upon a principles-based, risk-
focused approach and there have been no recommendations of note for the introduction of
prescriptive or legislative requirements as might have originally been anticipated in 2002’’
(IFAC 2006, 14). Indeed, they go on to comment that the ‘‘preference appears to be for an
internal control system than sits within a risk management framework’’ (14). We interpret
these remarks as supporting a continuing interest in reporting on internal control using a
broad risk management, principles-based approach.
In The Netherlands, the Peters Committee (1997) suggested that the supervisory board
of Dutch companies discuss the effectiveness of internal control. The fact that such a
discussion has been held (but not necessarily the content of the discussion) should be
mentioned in the supervisory board’s report in the ﬁrm’s annual report. The Peters Com-
mittee, whose guidance was in place during the period that this study is conducted, further
recommended that management keep the supervisory board informed about mechanisms to
1 Further guidance on internal control has been provided in the follow-up COSO report, Enterprise Risk Man-
agement (COSO 2004).38 Deumes and Knechel
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control ﬁnancial risk. Compared to recommendations and regulations in the U.K.2 and the
U.S.,3 the recommendations of the Peters Committee were less extensive and detailed. In
2003, four years subsequent to this study, the Tabaksblat Committee extended these rec-
ommendations by strongly encouraging the management board to declare in the annual
report that internal risk management and control systems are ‘‘adequate and effective.’’ The
approach to internal control adopted by the Tabaksblat Committee reﬂects international
principles of good corporate governance and is quite broad, encompassing strategy, oper-
ations, and reporting.
The corporate governance code of the Tabaksblat Committee was eventually incorpo-
rated into Dutch law and is currently in effect. As a result, listed companies in The Neth-
erlands are now required to comply with the best practice provisions of the code, or explain
why they do not apply the provisions (i.e., the so-called ‘‘comply or explain’’ approach).4
Internal control disclosures in The Netherlands are not subject to audit and only marginally
reviewed by the external auditor for inconsistencies with other parts of the ﬁnancial state-
ments. In summary, before the corporate governance code of the Tabaksblat Committee
appeared in 2003, reporting on internal control was voluntary in The Netherlands, i.e.,
managers were free to choose whether they conformed with national and/or international
best practice recommendations relating to reporting on internal risk management and control
systems. This provides a rich environment in which to study the economic and market
incentives for nonmandatory reporting on internal control.
Prior Research
The topic of reporting on internal control has long been of interest to accounting
researchers (e.g., McMullen et al. 1996), but has gained new interest as a result of the
disclosure requirements of SOX Sections 302 and 404. Prior to SOX, Hermanson (2000)
observed that stakeholders generally believed that internal control would aid decision mak-
ing, and that voluntary reporting would motivate management to improve internal control.
However, reporting on internal control is costly due to the need to collect and evaluate
information about systems and processes prior to preparing a report (Solomon and Cooper
1990), and these costs may be disproportionately higher for smaller ﬁrms (McMullen et al.
1996).5 Additionally, managers put their reputation at stake and risk incurring litigation
costs when they make deﬁnitive statements about internal control that later turn out wrong
(Raghunandan and Rama 1994; McMullen et al. 1996). Another potential cost of reporting
on internal control is revealing proprietary information to competitors, for example when
2 See reports by the Cadbury Committee (1992a, 1992b), Rutteman Committee (1994), Hampel Committee (1998a,
1998b), and Turnbull Committee (1999). McMullen et al. (1996) and Hermanson (2000) provide extensive
overviews of the public policy debate and recommendations on internal control reporting in the U.S. Geiger and
Taylor (2003) discuss the background and details of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s internal control certiﬁcations.
3 See reports by the Cohen Commission (1978), Treadway Commission (1987), COSO (1992), Public Oversight
Board (1993), and especially the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Mills (1997) provides an overview of public
policy recommendations on internal control reporting in the U.K. up to the Hampel Committee (1998a, 1998b).
The ﬁnal report of the Hampel Committee (1998a) and its Combined Code (Hampel Committee 1998b) rec-
ommended that directors review the effectiveness of the internal control system and report to the shareholders
that they have done so. The auditor should report on internal control privately to the directors. A working party
of the Committee (Turnbull Committee 1999) issued new guidance to implement the requirements on internal
control and reporting on internal control.
4 The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets supervises annual reporting by companies. However, it is
still entirely up to the shareholders to accept explanations for nonapplication.
5 McMullen et al. (1996) also ﬁnd that smaller ﬁrms are less likely to have ﬁnancial reporting problems if
management reports on internal control.Economic Incentives for Voluntary Internal Control Reporting 39
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a ﬁrm discloses detailed information on its procedures to manage key risks. Taken together,
these incentives may have limited management’s willingness to voluntarily report on inter-
nal control in the past, especially if they did not face a strong demand from stakeholders
for such reports (in the absence of regulation on the issue).
The passage of SOX signiﬁcantly altered the calculus of disclosure regarding internal
control, requiring U.S. registrants to provide audited a report on the quality of internal control
over ﬁnancial reporting. While the beneﬁts of such reports are still subject to debate, pre-
liminary evidence indicates that the compliance costs for Section 404 are substantial, par-
ticularly for smaller ﬁrms (Eldridge and Kealey 2005; Foley & Lardner LLP 2005; FEI
2005; Gurchiek 2005; McCollum 2005; Shearman & Sterling LLP 2005). A large volume
of research has examined the possible beneﬁts of SOX rules from a variety of perspectives
including the stock market reaction to disclosures of such weaknesses (e.g., De Franco et
al. 2005; Hammersley et al. 2008), as well as the effect on accruals quality (e.g., Doyle et al.
2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006a; Be ´dard 2006) and the cost of capital (e.g., Ogneva
et al. 2006; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006b; Beneish et al. 2008). Yet other research has
addressed the effect of material weaknesses on audit delay (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2006), audit
fees (e.g., Elder 2006; Bedard et al. 2006; Hoitash et al. 2007; Ettredge et al. 2007), and
the control risk factors leading to the presence of internal control problems such as orga-
nizational complexity, rapid organizational change, and a lack of resources to invest in
internal control systems (Ge and McVay 2005; Doyle et al. 2007b; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.
2007). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) speciﬁcally examine factors associated with incentives
to discover and report internal control weaknesses such as auditor size, recent restatements,
and ownership concentration.
In commenting on prior research, Leone (2007) notes that the evidence on the incentives
to report on internal control is not fully convincing given that most of the recent research
has been conducted in an environment where such reporting is not really voluntary. One
exception to this observation is Bronson et al. (2006, BCR henceforth), who study annual
reports from 1998 of mid-sized U.S. ﬁrms, and compare the form and content of pre-SOX
management reports on internal control with disclosures made in accordance with Section
404. While 36 percent of the ﬁrms in the sample of BCR voluntarily included a management
report on internal control, only 15 percent reported that controls were effective. None of
the ﬁrms reporting on internal controls disclosed any weaknesses, and no reports included
an auditor attestation. Furthermore, BCR ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms and ﬁrms with active audit
committees were more likely to report on internal control prior to SOX, while ﬁrms with
rapid growth were less likely. The size effect observed by BCR is consistent with prior
research indicating that Fortune 100 companies tended to voluntarily include a management
report on internal control (Raghunandan and Rama 1994; Willis and Lightle 2000), while
smaller companies did not (McMullen et al. 1996). BCR also note that prior to SOX
most internal control disclosures addressed ﬁnancial reporting risk rather than a broader view
of internal control as embodied in COSO. A possible explanation for this is that U.S. ﬁrms
may have had less developed enterprise risk management (ERM) processes compared to
non-U.S. ﬁrms (Beasley et al. 2005).
Thus, in spite of extensive research examining reporting on internal control, the incen-
tives for reporting on risk management and a broad range of controls in a low regulation
environment are still relatively unknown. A related question is what determines the extent
of these disclosures. More speciﬁcally, the observed cross-sectional variation in internal
control reporting remains largely unexplained, especially in settings where internal control
reporting covers a wider business-based approach that is consistent with COSO. This study40 Deumes and Knechel
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addresses these questions by examining managers’ economic motives for making internal
control disclosures. More speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that managers voluntarily report on
internal control to reduce the efﬁciency loss of information and agency problems.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Demand for Monitoring
While the agency relationship between managers and investors is well understood, an
important aspect of coping with agency conﬂicts is the need to control the behavior of
managers through monitoring, including accounting and auditing mechanisms (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). An important proposition of agency theory
is that managers have incentives to expend resources on monitoring to reduce the efﬁciency
loss of agency problems. In the absence of monitoring, investors will anticipate that man-
agers’ interests diverge from theirs, and take this into account when pricing their claims on
the ﬁrm. Several empirical studies have relied on Jensen and Meckling’s framework to
explain the voluntary adoption of monitoring mechanisms. For example, Chow (1982) ex-
amines the association between voluntary external auditing and agency conﬂicts. In a similar
vein, voluntary ﬁnancial reporting can be considered a monitoring mechanism (Leftwich et
al. 1981; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Craswell and Taylor 1992).
Others investigate the relationship between agency conﬂicts and quality differentiated
external audits (Francis and Wilson 1988; DeFond 1992), timely ﬁnancial reviews (Ettredge
et al. 1994), and the voluntary formation of audit committees (Pincus et al. 1989; Bradbury
1990; Collier 1993; Menon and Williams 1994; and Collier and Gregory 1999). Internal
control (including internal auditing) can also serve as a monitoring mechanism that reduces
the efﬁciency loss of agency conﬂicts (Anderson et al. 1993; DeFond 1992) because the
system provides management with more reliable information for ﬁnancial reporting pur-
poses (COSO 1992; Keasey and Wright 1993). Even though external control mechanisms
(e.g., independent external auditing) have an advantage in detecting management fraud,
internal control may be better in detecting unintentional errors and employee wrongdoing
(Hay and Knechel 2005).
Beneﬁts of Internal Control Reporting
Internal control is not directly observable by investors because it is, in essence, a set
of activities within the organization. Besides this lack of transparency, dispersed investors
have little or no incentive to actively gather information about internal control. Conse-
quently, in the absence of disclosure of private information about internal control, investors
are unlikely to be fully informed about the nature, extent, and quality of internal controls.
This makes it difﬁcult for them to observe managers’ efforts to manage risks or to provide
reliable information by maintaining adequate internal controls. Managers possess superior
knowledge about internal control. In order to reduce the efﬁciency loss of agency problems
resulting from this information asymmetry, managers may have an incentive to make vol-
untary disclosures about internal control.
Although information asymmetry is implied in an agency framework, it can have further
implications for a ﬁrm’s voluntary disclosure of risk management and internal control. For
example, it creates an incentive for managers to provide voluntary disclosure to reduce
the cost of capital (Healy and Palepu 2001) since reduced information asymmetry lowers the
risk of investors in forecasting future payoffs from their investment (Barry and Brown 1985,
1986). While this argument applies to disclosure in general, voluntary internal control dis-
closure can also reduce estimation risk because internal controls mitigate the threat ofEconomic Incentives for Voluntary Internal Control Reporting 41
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providing unreliable information to investors. To the extent that investors are reassured by
disclosure that the internal control system provides them with reliable information, they
will require a lower cost of capital. Since internal control can also relate to managing
business risk and includes controls with an operational nature, investors’ may further per-
ceive disclosing ﬁrms as being less risky in general, thereby reducing investor uncertainty
about future corporate performance.
Relevance and Credibility of Internal Control Reporting
Internal control disclosure can reduce the efﬁciency loss of information and agency
problems only if investors perceive that the information is relevant and credible. Hermanson
(2000) reports that ﬁnancial statement users perceive voluntary reporting on internal control
as informative above and beyond the information content of the audit report. An external
ﬁnancial statement audit may not be an efﬁcient way to communicate the effectiveness of
internal control for at least two reasons (Hermanson 2000). First, auditing standards require
that the external auditor obtain an understanding of the internal control system sufﬁcient
to plan the audit. However, the external auditor may or may not evaluate the strength of
internal control when certifying ﬁnancial statements. In particular, the auditor may decide
that it is more economical to audit details of ﬁnancial statements (e.g., transactions and
balances) than the reporting process.6 Second, in cases where the auditor evaluates the
strength of internal controls, the evaluation focuses primarily on internal controls over
ﬁnancial reporting, which are not necessarily the same internal controls that are relevant
for the efﬁciency and effectiveness of business processes. Besides traditional controls over
ﬁnancial reporting, internal controls reported on can also encompass operational controls,
which include risk assessment and risk management activities (Mills 1997; Short et al.
1999; COSO 2004). For investors, information about such activities is likely to be very
relevant as it reveals whether management understands the risks in the business and is
managing them actively.
Credibility of reporting on internal control may be a larger problem. Although the
COSO framework for evaluating internal control has been available since 1992, and is
recognized as one source of authoritative guidance by the PCAOB, its use has never been
mandated. Consequently, measurement and reporting standards admit much room for judg-
ment and ﬂexibility. Fortunately, the credibility of voluntary disclosures can be augmented
in a variety of ways. For example, the presence of independent outside directors, the ex-
istence of an audit committee, and the external auditor’s independent review of unaudited
portions of the ﬁnancial statements may help to ensure truthful reporting by management.
Additionally, managers put their reputation at stake and risk incurring litigation costs when
they make false internal control disclosures. This may give investors conﬁdence in the
credibility of internal control disclosures. Furthermore, in the Netherlands the source of the
report may matter to investors, with supervisory directors, who are essentially independent,
being deemed more trustworthy than executive directors.7
6 While internal control over ﬁnancial reporting is now an integrated part of the audit in the U.S. under the rules
of the PCAOB, similar rules do not yet apply outside of the U.S.
7 We do not expect, however, that the incentives for disclosure differ considerably between the management board
and the supervisory board in a two-tier board. In the presence of high (low) agency problems, both boards could
be more (less) inclined to mitigate the efﬁciency loss resulting from these problems by voluntary reporting on
internal control. Furthermore, in many Dutch companies, the supervisory board would subsume many of the
responsibilities of an audit committee in countries with one-tier boards.42 Deumes and Knechel
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Hypotheses
A manager’s decision to disclose information about internal control is presumably based
on a cost-beneﬁt analysis. As explained in the last section, we conjecture that an important
beneﬁt of voluntary reporting on internal control is a reduction of the efﬁciency loss of
information and agency problems. Because we expect the beneﬁts to vary with the degree
of these problems, we hypothesize that in a low-regulation environment, managers are more
(less) likely to report on internal control if information and agency problems are higher
(lower). For our analysis, we use three proxies for information and agency problems.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis concerns the extent to which outside equity ownership is concen-
trated. More concentrated equity ownership by outsiders lowers information and agency
problems because block holders are more willing and able to actively monitor the ﬁrm
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992). In contrast, information and agency problems increase if
outside ownership is more diffuse as it is relatively more expensive and difﬁcult for dis-
persed investors with small shareholdings to actively monitor management’s activities
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). While this argument implies that diffusion of ownership in-
creases the need for alternative monitoring mechanisms, including accounting and auditing,
Bronson et al. (2006) hypothesize that the presence of signiﬁcant block holders will increase
the propensity of ﬁrm’s to report on internal control because they would closely monitor the
quality of a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial reporting. However, BCR did not ﬁnd evidence in support of
this expectation. BCR also examine institutional ownership, a speciﬁc type of potential
block holder, and ﬁnd a positive association with control reporting using the percentage of
stock owned collectively by institutional shareholders as a measure of institutional owner-
ship. However, the descriptive statistics in both Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) and Leone
(2007) show that separate institutions on average do not individually own a sizeable block
of a company’s stock. Also, although the percentage of stock in a speciﬁc ﬁrm that is held
by an individual institutional shareholder may be large, such holdings may constitute a very
small portion of the institution’s overall investments, thus making them less likely to ac-
tively monitor a speciﬁc company than other forms of concentrated ownership. This sug-
gests that the ﬁndings of BCR on institutional ownership are consistent with increased
levels of information and agency risks. For these reasons, our ﬁrst hypothesis predicts that
ownership concentration is negatively associated with the extent of voluntary internal con-
trol disclosure.
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the degree of outside
ownership concentration and the extent to which company management re-
ports on internal control.
Our second hypothesis addresses the degree of top managers’ equity ownership in the
ﬁrm. Higher managerial ownership lowers agency conﬂicts because managers’ and share-
holders’ interests become more aligned (Jensen and Meckling 1976). BCR hypothesize, but
do not ﬁnd, a negative association between inside ownership and reporting on internal
control over ﬁnancial reporting. In the broader context of risk management and related
internal control activities, we expect that there will be a relationship. Consequently, our
second hypothesis predicts that management ownership is negatively associated with the
extent of voluntary internal control disclosure.
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between the degree of man-
agerial ownership and the extent to which company management reports on
internal control.Economic Incentives for Voluntary Internal Control Reporting 43
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Our ﬁnal hypothesis deals with the degree of ﬁnancial leverage. Whereas the ﬁrst
and second proxy are related to information and agency problems between management and
shareholders, ﬁnancial leverage is related to agency problems between shareholders and debt
holders. One problem between shareholders and debt holders is that shareholders may have
an incentive for excessive risk taking. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others have sug-
gested that higher leverage will increase agency conﬂicts because the potential for wealth
transfers from debt holders to shareholders increases. Bronson et al. (2006) hypothesize,
but do not ﬁnd, a positive association between leverage and reporting on internal control
over ﬁnancial reporting. In the broader context of risk management and related internal
control activities, we expect that there will be a relationship between reporting and ﬁnancial
leverage. Thus, our third hypothesis predicts that ﬁnancial leverage is positively associated
with the extent of voluntary internal control disclosure.
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the degree of ﬁnan-




The data used in this study is obtained from publicly traded ﬁrms in The Netherlands
during the period 1997–1999. In many ways, equity markets in The Netherlands are similar
to the U.S. and U.K. The Netherlands is generally regarded as a country with a well-
developed capital market system, with broad share ownership, although with more concen-
trated ownership than in the U.S. (Kabir et al. 1997). Dutch accounting and auditing
traditions are closer to the Anglo-American than to the Continental-European tradition
(Mueller et al. 1994; Nobes 1998; De Jong et al. 2001).8 Also, the Dutch stock exchange
is highly active with a number of very large multinational corporations, e.g., Philips, Shell,
and Unilever (Nobes 2004). On the other hand, the litigation environment in The Nether-
lands is less severe than in the U.S. (Wingate 1997).
While highly developed, the corporate governance structure of Dutch ﬁrms differs
somewhat from the U.S. and the U.K. in that they have a two-tier board structure, with a
management board consisting of inside directors and a supervisory board consisting of
mostly independent outside directors. In accordance with Dutch law, the supervisory board is
responsible for the supervision of management policy. Although the supervisory board does
not speciﬁcally represent shareholders or any other group of stakeholders, it is required to
act in the best interests of the corporation as a whole (Douma 1997; Maassen and Bosch
1999). Furthermore, the corporate governance system in The Netherlands reﬂects a large
degree of networking across organizations, allowing for tight direct control over organiza-
tions by strategic partners (Moerland 1995).
We feel that The Netherlands offers a unique setting to study the issue of voluntary
reporting on internal control for a number of reasons. First, we expect that reporting on
risk management and internal control covers a wide business-based approach in this setting
and time period. Second, while existing national and international frameworks for internal
control recommended reporting to external parties, there was no legal obligation to do so
(or to explain not doing so) in The Netherlands during the sample period for this study.
8 For instance, LaPorta et al. (1998) show that in terms of shareholder and creditor rights; quality of law enforce-
ment, quality of accounting standards, and ownership concentration; the Netherlands are closer to the common
law countries than to the code law group with which they are typically grouped.44 Deumes and Knechel
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Also, because the available Dutch guidance is less speciﬁc than in the U.S. or the U.K.,
there may be a greater variability in the nature of the disclosures. Third, due to the relatively
lower risk of litigation, management is likely to be more forthcoming with such information
than in the U.S. As a result, we expect to observe a relatively wide range of disclosure
practices. Fourth, ownership structure and the incentives for shareholders to actively monitor
managers vary widely in The Netherlands (De Jong et al. 2001).
Sample and Data
The sample consists of all Dutch ﬁrms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange during
the period 1997–1999, excluding investment funds and ﬁnancial institutions (e.g., banks
and insurance companies). The sample contains 155, 168, and 167 observations for 1997,
1998, and 1999, respectively (i.e., 490 ﬁrm-year observations). Across years there are 192
unique ﬁrms in the sample.9 Data on the dependent variable was retrieved from ﬁrms’annual
reports. Most data on the independent variables was available in the public Dutch databases
‘‘REACH’’ and ‘‘Het Financieel Economisch Lexicon.’’ In addition, data was obtained from
public databases of the Dutch exchange supervisor ‘‘Authority for the Financial Markets.’’
Dependent Variable (ICD)
The extent of voluntary reporting on internal control is measured with an internal
control disclosure index (ICD). ICD was obtained in three steps following a process similar
to other disclosure studies (e.g., Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Botosan 1997). The ﬁrst
step was to identify the disclosure items to include in the index. Based on a comprehensive
review of public policy reports on corporate governance and internal control, we identiﬁed
six separate reportable items. The appendix provides a discussion of the speciﬁc disclosure
items and their potential information content and disclosure costs. The ﬁrst item is unique
to The Netherlands, Items 2 through 5 are derived from non-Dutch guidance, and Item 6
is speciﬁcally mentioned in Dutch public policy guidance. No other recommendations on
internal control disclosure were available in Dutch public policy reports at the time, and
the six items capture all internal control information generally available in annual reports
of Dutch-listed ﬁrms in the study period.
The second step was to examine annual reports to identify the presence or absence of
each disclosure item. Dutch annual reports consist of the primary ﬁnancial statements plus
‘‘other information,’’ e.g., the report of the supervisory board and the report of the man-
agement board. Item 1 was found in the report of the supervisory board. Items 2, 3, 4, and
5 were found in the report of the management board. Item 6 was found in either the report
of the management board or the footnotes to the ﬁnancial statements. To control for sub-
jectivity in interpreting the annual reports, two independent raters examined the annual
reports. Inter-rater agreement ranged from 94 to 100 percent for different disclosure items.
Perreault and Leigh’s (1989) interjudge reliability index ranged from .93 to 1.00, where
.80 is considered an acceptable lower limit. After jointly re-examining the annual reports
for which the initial examinations differed, the researchers agreed upon the classiﬁcation
of each item.
The third step was to calculate a score for each ﬁrm in the sample. We did this by
summing all six disclosure items, placing equal weight on each item. The resulting index
measures the extent to which management voluntarily reports on internal control from zero
(no items disclosed) to six (all items disclosed), and is treated as an ordered variable in
9 For 24, 38, and 130 ﬁrms; we have one, two, and three years of observations, respectively.Economic Incentives for Voluntary Internal Control Reporting 45
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our analysis. We examine the sensitivity of our results to this speciﬁcation of ICD in
subsequent analysis.
Test Variables
We use three test variables in our main analysis, one for each hypothesis. Speciﬁcally,
we use the following proxies for information and agency problems:
● Ownership concentration (OC) is measured by the proportion of a ﬁrm’s outstanding
stock owned by outside block holders, which we deﬁne as shareholdings of non-
managers greater than 5 percent.
● Managerial ownership (MO) is measured by adding up the percentage of shares held
by members of the management board. In The Netherlands, owners of more than 5
percent of the shares of a ﬁrm are required to report their share of ownership to
Dutch stock exchange supervisor ‘‘Authority for the Financial Markets.’’ Because
this data is publicly available, the names of the shareholders were compared with
the names of the members of the management board. Shareholdings smaller than 5
percent are not disclosed.
● Financial leverage (LEV) is measured by the ratio of the book value of debt to the
sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt.
Control Variables
We also consider a number of control variables that might provide some explanation
of internal control disclosure beyond the information and agency problems on which our
hypotheses focus. Our control variables are broadly classiﬁed into three categories: (1)
inherent risk within an organization, (2) the potential cost of internal control disclosure,
and (3) alternative control mechanisms. First, investors care more about internal control, and
beneﬁt more from monitoring internal control, when there is a high level of inherent risk
within an organization. High inherent risk can give managers an incentive to report on
internal control to meet investor demand. Factors that increase inherent risk include com-
plexity and scope of operations, rapid growth, and accounting risks (Ashbaugh-Skaife et
al. 2007). On the other hand, high inherent risk can increase the chance that weaknesses
occur in internal control. Under such circumstances, managers may be less inclined to report
on internal control. In particular, they may be more hesitant to acknowledge their respon-
sibility for internal control, and are less likely to state that internal controls are effective if
their ﬁrm has weak internal controls.10 Second, the cost of internal control reporting may
vary across ﬁrms, whether in the form of creating and distributing the information, increas-
ing reputation and litigation risk, or revealing proprietary information to competitors. Third,
the strength of alternative governance mechanisms such as the independent external auditor,
independent outside directors, and regulations related to cross-listings may inﬂuence inter-
nal control reporting. We use the following control variables in this study:11
10 From an economic perspective, managers of ﬁrms with weak internal controls can avoid disclosure costs by not
reporting, but investors will infer the worst from nonreporting if they expect, but do not receive, a report from
management on internal control, i.e., believe there is weak internal control (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003).
11 Reported results are robust to adding several other potential control variables: stock price volatility (measured
as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns), market beta (measured as the covariance of monthly stock
returns with the market), earnings variability (measured as standard deviation of the earnings-to-price ratio),
variability of return on assets (measured as standard deviation of net income to average book value of total
assets), earnings-to-price ratio, book-to-market value of equity, labor intensity (measured as the ratio of personnel
expenses to total expenses), whether the ﬁrm issued securities in the period after disclosure (indicator), and
whether the ﬁrm has an audit committee (indicator).46 Deumes and Knechel
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● Firm Size (SIZE): Larger ﬁrms may be harder to control because of problems of
moral hazard internal to the ﬁrm (Williamson 1967; Abdel-khalik 1993). Addition-
ally, large ﬁrms tend to be more complex and have more varied operations. These
attributes increase inherent risk and would make it more likely for managers to report
on internal control. However, high inherent risk also makes it more likely that weak-
nesses in internal control occur, which can lower the likelihood that managers are
willing to report. Nevertheless, although the risk exposure is higher, managers of
larger ﬁrms may be more able to prevent weaknesses, because they have more re-
sources available and may enjoy economies of scale in developing, implementing,
and reporting on internal control. Finally, larger ﬁrms may have greater external
agency problems (Chow 1982). We measure SIZE as the sum of market value of
equity and book value of debt.
● Foreign operations (FO): The establishment of foreign operations creates political,
economic, and cultural risks not found in domestic ﬁrms. In addition, the complexity
of transactions often increases due to joint ventures, international tax issues, and
foreign exchange transactions (Hermanson and Hermanson 1994). The wider scope
of operations and greater complexity may give rise to higher inherent risk, making
it more likely that managers will report on internal control. The likelihood of re-
porting however may also be lower because of a greater chance of weaknesses
internal control. We measure FO as the ratio of foreign subsidiaries to total
subsidiaries.
● Proﬁtability (PR): Well performing ﬁrms may have more resources available to invest
in internal control, making it more likely that they have effective internal controls
in place. On the other hand, investors may be less interested in the internal con-
trols of well performing ﬁrms because inherent risk is lower. We measure PR as the
ratio of net income to average book value of total assets.
● Sales Growth (SG): A fast growing ﬁrm may outgrow its internal systems and may
require time to make new investments in internal control. This leads to higher in-
herent risk, increasing the incentive for management to report on internal control.
However, managers may be hesitant to report on internal controls that are weakened
by rapid growth. We measure SG as the ﬁrm’s year-over-year sales growth.12
● Inventory (INV) and Receivables (REC): Firms with higher levels of inventory and
receivables may be subject to greater inherent risk as it may expose them to greater
accounting risks (Kinney and McDaniel 1989). Again, this may either increase or
decrease the likelihood of reporting. We measure INV as the ratio of book value
of inventory to book value of total assets, and REC as the ratio of book value of
receivables to book value of total assets.
● Industry classiﬁcation (MAN and TRADE): In general, different industries display
different patterns of disclosure (Botosan 1997). Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue
that ﬁrms in the same industry face similar incentive problems and use similar con-
tracting structures and accounting procedures. Others suggest that industry member-
ship is a surrogate proxy for variables that are associated with voluntary disclosure,
like political costs (Bazley et al. 1985) and proprietary costs (Craswell and Taylor
1992; Harris 1998). Also, inherent risk and the quality of internal controls may relate
12 Reported results are robust to measuring SG as an indicator equal to one if the ﬁrm is in the highest quintile
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to industry (Knechel and Willekens 2005). We use indicators that are equal to one
if ﬁrms operate in the manufacturing (MAN) or trade sector (TRADE), and zero
otherwise.13
● Cross-listing of shares (UK and US): Foreign stock exchanges have different re-
quirements regarding reporting on internal control. Listing rules in the U.S. and U.K.
may have been more encouraging about reporting on internal control due to the
existence of COSO (U.S.) and Turnbull (U.K.). Because the Dutch stock exchange
requires that ﬁrms provide the Dutch market with the same information as a foreign
market, cross-listing of shares may inﬂuence the extent to which management reports
on internal control. We measure US and UK as indicators that are one if the ﬁrm’s
shares are cross-listed in the U.K. or the U.S., respectively, and zero otherwise.
● Audit Quality (AQ): High quality independent audits may be a complement or sub-
stitute for other monitoring mechanisms (Francis and Wilson 1988; DeFond 1992).
On the one hand, the independent review of unaudited parts of the annual report by
a high quality external auditor may increase investors’ perception of the credibility
of voluntary reporting on internal control, increasing the value of such reports. On
the other hand, investors may perceive that voluntary reporting on internal control
is less necessary (relevant) if the ﬁnancial statements are audited by a high quality
auditor.14 We measure AQ as an indicator that is equal to one if the ﬁrm has a Big
6 or Big 5 auditor, and zero otherwise.
● Independent outside directors (OD): The value of voluntary reporting on internal
control may increase if monitoring by independent directors increases the credibility
of internal control disclosures. Alternatively, the value may decrease if investors
perceive that voluntary reporting on internal control is less relevant because man-
agers’ actions are monitored by independent directors. We measure OD as the ratio
of the number of independent outside directors (i.e., the number of supervisory
directors excluding so-called ‘‘afﬁliated’’ directors) to total directors.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics of ICD
Panel A of Table 1 shows the frequencies of reporting on separate items of ICD. The
ﬁrms in the sample report most frequently on Items 1 and 6. A possible explanation for
this is that these are the items recommended by the Peters Committee (1997). McNemar
tests are used to investigate the signiﬁcance of the year-to-year differences in reporting on
each item. When comparing the reporting of 146 ﬁrms that are included in the sample in
both 1997 and 1998, this test shows that ﬁrms report signiﬁcantly less on Item 2 in 1998
(p  .05). When comparing the reporting of 152 ﬁrms that are included in the sample in
both 1998 and 1999, the test show that ﬁrms report signiﬁcantly less on Item 1 in 1999 (p
 .05). For the 192 unique ﬁrms in the sample, we also tabulate the frequency of reporting
13 Reported results are robust to including a more elaborate set of indicators based on two- and three-digit codes
of the North American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS).
14 From the perspective of the auditor, more complete disclosures about internal controls may beneﬁt the reputation
of the audit ﬁrm. Independent auditors that seek to maintain a reputation of higher quality or to increase fees
may inﬂuence the extent of internal control reporting in their clients’ annual reports (Haring 1979; Watts and





























































Descriptive Statistics of Internal Control Disclosure Index (ICD)
Panel A: Elements of ICD









Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
Elements reported by the
supervisory board:
Item 1. The supervisory board
discussed (elements of) the
internal control systems in at
least one meeting
78 (50) 71 (42) 59 (35) 81 (42)
Elements reported by the
management board:
Item 2. The purpose of the
internal control system




9 (6) 10 (6) 13 (8) 12 (6)
Item 4. A statement about the
effectiveness of internal
control
9 (6) 8 (5) 8 (5) 7 (4)
Item 5. The role of the internal
auditor
15 (10) 15 (9) 16 (10) 16 (8)
Item 6. Activities to manage
risk
94 (61) 101 (60) 101 (61) 116 (60)



































































































Panel B: Aggregate ICDb

















Dev. Min. Max. W-Statistic
1997 155 41 (27) 47 (30) 46 (30) 9 (6) 7 (5) 2 (1) 3 (2) 1.43 1 1.31 0 6 .93***
1998 168 48 (29) 60 (36) 45 (27) 5 (3) 4 (2) 3 (2) 3 (2) 1.27 1 1.25 0 6 .90***
1999 167 48 (29) 66 (40) 33 (20) 9 (5) 6 (4) 3 (2) 2 (1) 1.26 1 1.25 0 6 .91***
1997–1999 192 52 (27) 74 (39) 49 (26) 5 (3) 7 (4) 2 (1) 3 (2) 1.27 1 1.21 0 6 .91***
Panel C: Spearman-Rank Correlations among ICD
ICD 1997 ICD 1998 ICD 1997–1999
ICD 1997 .88*** (n  155)
ICD 1998 .78*** (n  146) .93*** (n  168)
ICD 1999 .68*** (n  130) .84*** (n  152) .90*** (n  167)
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at p  .10, p  .05, and p  .01, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
a When calculating the frequency of reporting on each item across years for the 192 unique ﬁrms in the sample, each item is considered present if the ﬁrm reports it in
at least half of the years that it is included in the sample.
b Aggregate ICD is calculated for each ﬁrm by summing all reported items.50 Deumes and Knechel
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on each item across years (ICD 1997–1999), considering each item present if it was re-
ported in at least half of the years that a ﬁrm is included in the sample.15
Panel B of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of aggregate ICD for each year
and across years. Although ICD is ranked from 0 to 6, few ﬁrms reported three or more
items. As a result, the average value of ICD is relatively low. The Shapiro-Wilk W tests
show that the assumption about the normality of the distribution for ICD can be rejected
(p  .01). Panel B further shows that for the full sample the mean value of ICD decreases
from 1997 to 1998.16 However, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests indicate that the distribution of
the aggregate ICD does not differ signiﬁcantly between the years: ICD for 1997 was paired
with 1998 (p  .47; n  146) and 1999 (p  .84; n  130), and ICD for 1998 was
paired with 1999 (p  .94; n  152). Panel C of Table 1 presents the Spearman-rank
correlations among ICD in paired samples. These are quite high so we conclude that man-
agers’ overall strategy for reporting on internal control did not signiﬁcantly change over
the three-year period.
Reliability of ICD
Several tests were carried out to further assess the statistical reliability of ICD.A
standard measure of reliability is internal consistency, which applies to the consistency
among the items in a summated score. Individual items of the score should all be measuring
the same construct and should be highly inter-correlated with item-to-total correlations in
excess of .50 and inter-item correlations in excess of .30 (Robinson et al. 1991). For the
total sample of 1997, 1998, and 1999, the average item-to-total correlation is .57. All
coefﬁcients of the item-to-total correlations are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
In addition, the average inter-item correlation is .39 and most coefﬁcients of the inter-item
correlations are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. The high inter-item correla-
tions show that some items comprising ICD tend not to be reported unless another item is
also reported, e.g., Item 2 was not reported unless Item 6 was also disclosed. Another type
of diagnostic measure is Cronbach’s alpha, which tests the consistency of the entire scale.
Cronbach’s alpha for 1997, 1998, 1999, and 1997–1999 is .72, .74, .70, and .72, respec-
tively. The generally agreed lower limit for Cronbach’s alpha is .70 (Robinson et al. 1991).
Descriptive Statistics of Test and Control Variables
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the tests and control variables. Additional
Shapiro-Wilk W tests show that the assumption about the normality of the distribution of
most variables can be rejected at p  .01.
15 For ﬁrms for which we have three years of observations, an item is considered present if disclosed in at least
two years, and for ﬁrms for which we have one or two years of observations, an item is considered present if
disclosed in at least one year. Reported results are robust to excluding ﬁrms for which we have only one or two
years of observations from the analysis. Reported results are robust to considering each item present if it was
reported in any year that a ﬁrm is included in the sample or in each year. In general, ﬁrms report the same
items over time.
16 Mann-Whitney U tests show that for nine ﬁrms that are only included in 1997, the mean value of ICD is not
signiﬁcantly different from the other 146 ﬁrms in 1997 (p  .88; n  155). In contrast, for the 22 ﬁrms that
enter the sample in 1998, the mean value of ICD is signiﬁcantly lower compared to the other 146 ﬁrms (p
 .01; n  168). A possible explanation for this is that the ﬁrms that enter the sample in 1998 have signiﬁcantly
different ﬁrm characteristics that are hypothesized to inﬂuence ICD: MO is 15 percent higher (p  .01; n  168),
and LEV is 22 percent lower (p  .01; n  168) for these ﬁrms.Economic Incentives for Voluntary Internal Control Reporting 51
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics of All Test and Control Variablesa
Year n Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Ownership 1997 155 .37 .32 .26 .00 .98
Concentration 1998 168 .37 .35 .26 .00 .98
(OC) 1999 167 .39 .35 .27 .00 1.00
1997–1999 192 .39 .35 .26 .00 1.00
Managerial 1997 155 .07 .00 .18 .00 .96
Ownership 1998 168 .09 .00 .20 .00 .96
(MO) 1999 167 .10 .00 .21 .00 .96
1997–1999 192 .09 .00 .20 .00 .96
Financial 1997 155 .38 .37 .19 .02 .92
Leverage 1998 168 .38 .37 .22 .02 .89
(LEV) 1999 167 .38 .37 .22 .01 .85
1997–1999 192 .36 .36 .20 .02 .80
Firm Size 1997 155 2.12 .33 5.51 .01 33.34
(SIZE) 1998 168 2.16 .33 5.77 .01 32.03
1999 167 3.24 .36 9.31 .01 57.21
1997–1999 192 2.37 .32 6.34 .01 39.38
Foreign 1997 155 .45 .46 .30 .00 1.00
Operations 1998 168 .47 .50 .31 .00 1.00
(FO) 1999 167 .47 .47 .31 .00 1.00
1997–1999 192 .46 .47 .31 .00 1.00
Proﬁtability 1997 155 .07 .06 .08 .38 .31
(PR) 1998 168 .07 .07 .11 .38 .33
1999 167 .06 .06 .10 .31 .35
1997–1999 192 .06 .06 .09 .31 .32
Sales Growth 1997 155 .22 .13 .45 .50 2.76
(SG) 1998 168 .26 .12 .57 .42 3.30
1999 167 .27 .12 .52 .46 2.96
1997–1999 192 .30 .14 .49 .21 2.76
Inventory 1997 155 .18 .18 .14 .00 .52
(INV) 1998 168 .17 .17 .14 .00 .50
1999 167 .16 .15 .14 .00 .52
1997–1999 192 .16 .16 .14 .00 .48
Receivables 1997 155 .32 .30 .17 .00 .82
(REC) 1998 168 .32 .30 .17 .01 .75
1999 167 .33 .33 .18 .02 .75
1997–1999 192 .32 .31 .17 .00 .72
Independent 1997 155 .66 .67 .11 .38 .89
Outside 1998 168 .65 .67 .11 .33 .89
Directors 1999 167 .64 .64 .12 .33 .89













Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
Manufacturing (MAN) 69 (45) 70 (42) 64 (38) 75 (39)
Traded (TRADE) 31 (20) 31 (18) 30 (18) 36 (19)
Audit Quality (AQ) 146 (94) 155 (92) 155 (93) 179 (93)
(continued on next page)52 Deumes and Knechel














Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
Cross-Listing in U.K. (UK) 11 (7) 13 (8) 12 (7) 13 (7)
Cross-Listing in U.S. (US) 22 (14) 24 (14) 25 (15) 27 (14)
a For the period 1997–1999, means across years of all test and control variables are reported.
Variable Deﬁnitions:
OC  proportion of outstanding stock owned by outside block holders;
MO  proportion of shares held by members of the management board;
LEV  ratio of book value of total debt to sum of market value of equity and book value of debt;
SIZE  sum of market value of equity and book value of debt in billion euros;
FO  ratio of number of foreign subsidiaries to total subsidiaries;
PR  ratio of net income to book value of total assets;
SG  proportion of year-to-year sales growth;
INV  ratio of book value of inventory to book value of total assets;
REC  ratio of book value of receivables to book value of total assets;
OD  ratio of independent outside directors to total directors;
MAN  indicator equal to one if ﬁrm operates in the manufacturing sector, and zero otherwise;
TRADE  indicator equal to one if ﬁrm operates in the trade sector, and zero otherwise;
AQ  indicator equal to one if the ﬁrm’s external auditor is a Big 6 or Big 5 ﬁrm, and zero otherwise;
UK  indicator equal to one if the ﬁrm’s shares are cross-listed in the U.K., and zero otherwise; and
US  indicator equal to one if the ﬁrm’s shares are cross-listed in the U.S., and zero otherwise.
Univariate Analysis
Table 3 presents pair-wise Spearman-rank correlations among the test and control var-
iables and ICD over the period 1997–1999.17 The ﬁrst column of Table 3 provides a uni-
variate test for the relationship between ICD and each of the explanatory variables. Con-
sistent with our expectations, OC and MO are signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with ICD
(p  .05 and p  .01, respectively), and LEV is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with
ICD (p  .01). This provides preliminary support for our hypothesis that managers are
more (less) likely to report on internal control if information and agency problems are
higher (lower). ICD is further positively correlated with the control variables SIZE, FO,
US, UK, and AQ (p  .01).
Multivariate Analysis
We use ordered probit analysis to estimate a multivariate model with all speciﬁed test
and control variables included simultaneously (Aitchison and Silvey 1957; Greene 2000).
The ordered probit model takes into account the ordinal nature of ICD.18 Table 4 shows
the results of the ordered probit analysis for separate years and across years. For the analysis
across years, the aggregate ICD from 1997–1999 (as presented in Table 1, Panel B) is
regressed on three-year means of all test and control variables for all unique ﬁrms in the
17 Kendall’s tau yields identical results for both direction and signiﬁcance of all reported correlation coefﬁcients.




































































































Spearman-Rank Correlations among ICD, Test and Control Variables in the Period 1997–1999 (n  192)a,b,c
ICD OC MO LEV SIZE FO PR SG INV REC MAN TRADE US UK AQ
OC .18
MO .26 .30
LEV .20 .15 .22
SIZE .53 .20 .25 .04
FO .34 .22 .08 .14 .40
PR .03 .15 .24 .57 .09 .20
SG .07 .19 .39 .41 .14 .01 .25
INV .03 .08 .05 .36 .23 .01 .15 .27
REC .07 .09 .27 .00 .17 .10 .18 .15 .11
MAN .01 .01 .06 .11 .13 .18 .08 .27 .43 .23
TRADE .05 .16 .00 .17 .01 .15 .05 .02 .37 .03 .38
US .29 .13 .20 .10 .51 .27 .01 .02 .12 .23 .04 .08
UK .31 .18 .10 .06 .37 .21 .10 .04 .04 .16 .04 .02 .55
AQ .19 .00 .20 .16 .22 .16 .19 .10 .12 .07 .00 .08 .11 .07
OD .08 .19 .27 .13 .09 .01 .24 .19 .16 .18 .11 .03 .03 .04 .00
a Bold indicates signiﬁcance at p  .05, based on two-tailed tests. Absolute values of correlation coefﬁcients  0.18 are signiﬁcant at p  .01, based on two-tailed
tests.
b See Table 2 for variable deﬁnitions.
c Aggregate ICD across years (as presented in Table 1, Panel B) and means across years of all test and control variables (as presented in Table 2) are used to calculate
the reported correlation coefﬁcients. Correlations coefﬁcients for separate years are similar and not reported due to space limitations.54 Deumes and Knechel
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TABLE 4














OC  1.08*** .94*** 1.06*** 1.26*** 1.61***
MO  2.13*** 1.49*** 1.01** 1.47*** 1.40***
LEV  .43 1.54*** 1.53*** 1.50*** 1.98***
Control Variables:
SIZE .02 .04** .01 .04** .05**
FO 1.09*** .86*** .55* .86*** 1.02***
PR 3.11** 1.84*** .95 2.29*** 1.56
SG .22 .06 .11 .12 .35*
INV .17 1.40 2.09*** 1.22 1.56
REC .09 .01 .13 .29 .53
MAN .04 .12 .34 .17 .34
TRADE .24 .43 .62** .58** .91***
US .15 .03 .11 .14 .18
UK .75* .68 1.17** .76* .93**
AQ .40 .41 .24 .33 .42
OD 1.46 1.32 1.02 1.59* 1.95**
Log likelihood 204.62 198.78  208.70 224.83 130.60
Wald 2 82.24*** 102.89*** 77.13*** 105.52*** 105.64***
Pseudo R2 13% 16% 14% 16% 25%
Sample size 155 168 167 192 192
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at p  .10, p  .05, and p  .01, respectively, based on one-tailed tests for the
test variables and two-tailed tests for the control variables.
a See Table 1 for the deﬁnition of ICD per year and across years and Table 2 for the deﬁnition of the test and
control variables. ALT ICD across years is deﬁned as a three-level ordered variable measuring the degree to
which ﬁrms voluntary comply with national and international best practice recommendations. It equals zero if a
ﬁrm does not comply with any national or international best practice recommendation, one if a ﬁrm complies
with any national best practice recommendation, and two if a ﬁrm complies with any international best practice
recommendation over and above any national best practice recommendation.
b For the regression analysis across 1997–1999, aggregate ICD across years (as presented in Table 1, Panel B)
and ALT ICD across years is regressed on means across years of all test and control variables (as presented in
Table 2).
sample.19 Additional tests gave no indication of multicollinearity problems in the regres-
sions. Pseudo R2 is 13, 16, 14, and 16 percent for the analysis of 1997, 1998, 1999, and
1997–1999, respectively, and the models’ ﬁt is signiﬁcant at p  .01 in all cases.
The results of the ordered probit regression across years shows that the three test
variables are signiﬁcantly associated with ICD at the 1 percent level in the direction pre-
dicted. Furthermore, OC is signiﬁcant and negative at p  .01 in all three years. MO is
19 Simply pooling the observations and including a set of year dummies (time ﬁxed effects) would underestimate
the true standard errors because it ignores serial correlation (Wooldridge 2006, 448–498). Our results are robust
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signiﬁcant and negative in two years at p  .01 and one year at p  .05. Finally, LEV
is signiﬁcant and positive in two years (p  .01) but insigniﬁcant in 1997. We interpret
these results as providing strong support for all three hypotheses. Overall, ﬁnding that ICD
varies systematically with our proxies for information and agency problems suggests that
there are economic reasons why managers voluntarily report more (or less) on internal
control. It also conﬁrms the view that managers weigh the costs and beneﬁts, and report
only if beneﬁts in the form of reduced efﬁciency loss of information and agency problems
outweigh the costs.
Several control variables proxy for inherent risk, which can increase the likelihood of
reporting because there is greater investor demand for information, or decrease the likeli-
hood if it results in weaker internal controls on which management would report. SIZE is
signiﬁcantly positively associated with ICD in 1998 and across years. FO is signiﬁcant
positive in all separate years and across years, indicating that managers are more likely to
report if complexity and scope of operations is higher. PR is signiﬁcantly associated with
ICD in 1997 and 1998 as well across years. This suggests that more resources available to
invest in internal control leads to stronger internal controls for managers to report on.20 We
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant association for SG, INV, and REC except for one negative association
between INV and ICD in 1999. TRADE shows that ﬁrms operating in the trade sector are
signiﬁcantly more transparent about internal controls in 1999 and across years. A cross-
listing of shares in the UK is associated with more internal control reporting in 1997, 1999
and across years (but US is not). This is presumably due to stricter requirements regarding
internal control reporting in the UK. Finally, AQ is not associated with ICD, while the
coefﬁcient of OD is marginally signiﬁcant and positive across years. The latter provides
some evidence that independent supervisory board members improve investors’ perception
of the credibility of internal control disclosures.
Supplemental Analysis
Recognizing that our primary test variables may contain measurement error, we re-
estimated our results using a large number of alternative measures. First, results for OC
(not reported) are robust to (1) deﬁning outside block holders as shareholdings of nonman-
agers greater than 10 percent, (2) measuring OC as an indicator that is equal to one if at
least 5 or 10 percent of shares are held by outside block holders, and (3) transforming OC
to a decile ranking. Second, results for MO are robust to (1) measuring MO as an indicator
that is equal to one if at least 5 percent of shares are held by members of the management
board and (2) transforming MO to a decile ranking. As can be seen from Table 2, while
more than half of the ﬁrms do not have substantial management shareholdings, the maxi-
mum reaches 96 percent. Finally, results for LEV are robust to transforming LEV in a decile
ranking.
An important assumption in the construction of ICD is that managers’ choice to report
on items comprising the disclosure index is not mandatory. One can question, however, to
what extent this assumption is entirely valid for Item 1 and Item 6, as reporting on these
items was recommended by a high proﬁle national committee (Peters Committee 1997).
Although managers had unconditional freedom to decide whether or not to apply these
recommendations at the time of the study, they are likely to have faced more external
pressure to report on these items. In essence, the term voluntary implies freedom of choice
20 The results for PR should be interpreted carefully. The results for PR are robust to dropping observations with
extremely high ﬁnancial leverage (LEV in the highest decile); they are not robust to dropping observations
with losses (PR smaller than zero). Results for LEV are robust in either case.56 Deumes and Knechel
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without external compulsion. Consequently, disclosure of Item 1 and Item 6 can be con-
sidered less voluntary in nature relative to disclosure of Items 2 through 5. In line with this
reasoning, reporting on Items 1 and 6 is relatively high (see Panel A of Table 1).
To address this issue, we alternatively specify ALT ICD 1997–1999 as a three-level
ordered variable measuring the degree to which ﬁrms voluntary comply with national or
international best practice recommendations across years. ALT ICD 1997–1999 equals zero
if a ﬁrm does not comply with any national or international best practice recommendation
(i.e., no disclosure of any item in at least half of the years that a ﬁrm is included in the
sample), one if a ﬁrm complies with any national best practice recommendation (i.e., vol-
untary disclosure of Item 1 and/or 6 in at least half of the years that a ﬁrm is included in
the sample), and two if a ﬁrm complies with any international best practice recommendation
over and above any national best practice recommendations (i.e., voluntary disclosure
of Item 2, 3, 4, and/or 5 in addition to disclosure of Item 1 and/or 6 in at least half of
the years that a ﬁrm is included in the sample). For the 192 unique ﬁrms in the sample,
ALT ICD equals zero for 52 ﬁrms (27 percent), equals one for 117 ﬁrms (61 percent), and
equals two for 23 ﬁrms (12 percent). Notably, all ﬁrms that comply with any international
best practice recommendation also comply with any national best practice recommendation
(i.e., there are no ﬁrms that comply with any international but not with any national best
practice).
Table 4 shows the results of the ordered probit regressions of ALT ICD on three-year
means of all test and control variables for all unique ﬁrms in the sample. Pseudo R2 is 25
percent and the models’ ﬁt is signiﬁcant at p  .01. The results show that the three test
variables are signiﬁcantly associated with ALT ICD at the 1 percent level in the direction
predicted. We interpret this results as providing additional support for all three hypotheses.
With respect to the control variables, the results also corroborate our ﬁndings, except
for PR, which is not signiﬁcantly associated with ALT ICD. The positive association for
TRADE, UK, and OD, however, is more signiﬁcant, and the coefﬁcient for SG is now also
marginally signiﬁcant. The latter provides some evidence that higher inherent risk due to
faster sales growth increases managers’ incentives for voluntary disclosure on internal
control.
The measurement of ICD and ALT ICD involves potential measurement error. First,
the disclosed items may not be equally informative to investors. If an item does not have
any information content, the disclosure index may be overstated and could not be explained
by variables derived from agency theory. Second, the various items may be more or less
costly to disclose. Consequently, our results may be sensitive to inclusion/exclusions of
some items and to the equal weighting scheme used. To test the sensitivity of our results
to the speciﬁcation of ICD and ALT ICD, we recomputed the results if one or more items
are excluded from these indexes. Additionally, we tried various weighting schemes for ICD
that put substantially more or less weight on each item. The results of these tests (not
reported) lead us to conclude that Items 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are substantive disclosures, but
Item 2 may have been a form of ‘‘boilerplate’’ disclosure with little meaning, and can be
excluded from the index without affecting the analysis.
Next, we tested each item separately using probit analysis. Consistent with our other
sensitivity results, Table 5 shows that disclosure of all items is signiﬁcantly associated with
at least one proxy with the exception of Item 2. More speciﬁcally, Item 1 is signiﬁcantly
associated with OC (p  .10), MO (p  .05), and LEV (p  .10); Item 3 is signiﬁcantly as-
sociated with MO (p  .01), and LEV (p  .01); Item 4 is signiﬁcantly associated with
MO (p  .01); Item 5 is signiﬁcantly associated with OC (p  .01), and MO (p  .10);Economic Incentives for Voluntary Internal Control Reporting 57
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TABLE 5
Probit Regressions of Elements of ICD in the Period 1997–1999a
Predicted
Sign Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4 Item 5 Item 6
Intercept 1.22* 4.02*** 7.64*** 2.45* 3.20* 2.42**
Test Variables:
OC  .60* .94 1.05 .74 2.03*** 1.82***
MO  1.28** .28 11.85*** 12.39*** 10.93* .32
LEV  .90* .54 5.20*** .55 .44 2.93***
Control Variables:
SIZE .03 .03 .05** .00 .02 .65***
FO .42 1.46** 3.31*** 2.57** .83 .60
PR 3.77*** 4.31* 5.50 8.40*** 2.65 .61
SG .06 .41 .23 .14 .28 .21
INV 1.76* .86 2.58 1.36 .11 .95
REC .23 .29 4.64** 1.96 .28 .67
MAN .01 .07 .17 .08 .21 .70**
TRADE .26 1.12*** 2.04*** .05 .46 .70*
US .19 .98* 1.48** .63 .11 NA
UK .26 1.63*** 3.62*** .98** 1.29** NA
AQ .12 NA NA NA NA .20
OD 1.13 1.57 3.83* 2.96 2.58 1.44
Log likelihood 116.51 28.02 16.57 20.43 35.67 78.54
Wald 2 27.00** 45.48*** 53.45*** 25.43** 71.23*** 48.16***
Pseudo R2 11% 33% 63% 32% 35% 30%
Sample size 192 192 192 192 192 163
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at p  .10, p  .05, and p  .01, respectively, based on one-tailed tests for the
test variables and two-tailed tests for the control variables.
a See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of the test and control variables. Reporting of each item across years is regressed on
means across years of all test and control variables. Each item is considered reported across years if a ﬁrm
mentioned it in at least half of the years that it is included in the sample. Reported results for the test variables
are generally robust to considering each item present if it was reported in any year that a ﬁrm is included in
the sample or in each year.
Deﬁnitions of Dependent Variables:
Item 1  indicator equal to one if supervisory board reported that they discussed the internal control system,
and zero otherwise;
Item 2  indicator equal to one if the management board reported on the purpose of the internal control system,
and zero otherwise;
Item 3  indicator equal to one if the management board reported in the majority of years their responsibility
for internal control, and zero otherwise;
Item 4  indicator equal to one if the management board reported in the majority of years on the effectiveness
of internal controls, and zero otherwise;
Item 5  indicator equal to one if the management board reported in the majority of years about the role of the
internal auditor with respect to internal control, and zero otherwise; and
Item 6  indicator equal to one if the management board disclosed speciﬁc activities to manage risk, and zero
otherwise.58 Deumes and Knechel
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Item 6 is signiﬁcantly associated with OC (p  .01), and LEV (p  .01).21 Although the
drivers for disclosing each item seem to differ, it is difﬁcult to really separately predict and
interpret each item, as the level of voluntary disclosure on internal control is presumably
a ‘‘portfolio’’ decision by the ﬁrm.
Lennox (2005) points out that managerial ownership can affect agency costs in two
ways. While the literature indicates that the alignment-of-interests effect that we hypothe-
size may dominate within low and high regions of managerial ownership, there is also a
possibility that an opposing entrenchment effect occurs within an intermediate region of
managerial ownership (Morck et al. 1988). When managerial ownership falls into this
intermediate range, they can often insulate themselves from external pressure and their
incentives are likely to differ when compared to a smaller (or larger) share of the ownership
structure. There is no empirical evidence available in The Netherlands to indicate what this
intermediate range of managerial ownership would be (or if it exists). However, to test for
the possibility of managerial entrenchment, we re-estimated our results after dropping ob-
servations within an intermediate region of MO. We tested three possible ranges of en-
trenchment: (1) 5% to 25%, (2) 10% to 40%, and (3) 15% to 50%. The results (not reported)
are qualitatively identical to our primary results in Table 4.
SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS
We examine the relationship between the extent of voluntary reporting on risk man-
agement and internal control and information and agency problems using a sample of
publicly traded ﬁrms in The Netherlands during the period 1997–1999. A disclosure index
consisting of six reportable items measures the extent of voluntary internal control reporting.
Management shareholdings, block holder ownership, and ﬁnancial leverage proxy for in-
formation and agency problems. Overall, we ﬁnd that that the extent of voluntary internal
control reporting is positively associated with indications of information and agency prob-
lems. This is consistent with the explanation that in a low-regulation environment, managers
will voluntarily report on internal control to reduce the efﬁciency loss of these problems.
Sensitivity tests show that all but one of the reported items contribute to the results. Ad-
ditionally, we ﬁnd some evidence that the extent of internal control reporting varies with
ﬁrms’ inherent risk, as proxied by a number of operating characteristics. Based on the
results for the test variables, we conclude that managers make a conscious trade-off of
the costs and beneﬁts when making internal control disclosures.
Our ﬁndings may be relevant to the public policy debate on internal control reporting.
While the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) now requires U.S. reg-
istrants to report on internal control over ﬁnancial reporting, nonpublic companies in the
U.S. and businesses in most other countries are not required to produce such reports, or
are given an option to ‘‘disclose or explain.’’ The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) demands a
very speciﬁc and detailed documentation of ﬁnancial reporting controls while broader
frameworks favor principles-based approaches that consider risk management in the broad-
est business sense. Recent developments in The Netherlands have increased the regulation
21 The control variable AQ had to be dropped in the probit analyses of Items 2 through 5 because no ﬁrms with
low external audit quality reported on these items. The 13 observations with low external audit quality are
nonetheless used in the analyses because univariate Chi-square tests suggest that low external audit quality is
not associated with reporting on Items 2 through 5. Reported results are robust however to not using observations
with low external audit quality. The control variables US and UK had to be dropped in the probit analysis of
Item 6 because all 29 ﬁrms with a cross-listing reported on Item 6. Because univariate Chi-square tests indicate
that ﬁrms with a cross-listing are actually more likely to report on Item 6 (p  .01 for both US and UK), 29
observations with a cross-listing in the US and/or the UK are not used in the analysis, which reduces the sample
size to 163. Reported results are robust to including the 29 observations with a cross-listing.Economic Incentives for Voluntary Internal Control Reporting 59
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of reporting on internal control. Such reports are no longer ‘‘voluntary’’ in the sense that
Dutch ﬁrms are now required to (1) comment on the existence of operating and strategic
controls consistent with COSO and the Turnbull Committee and (2) report on the effect-
iveness of internal control over ﬁnancial reporting. However, Dutch ﬁrms do have the option
to either comply with these best practice provisions or explain why they are not complying
(Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code 2005). Thus, current rules adopt a
combination of a broad business view of internal control and the more narrow SOX-based
perspective.
More generally, the European Corporate Governance Forum (2006) advised the Euro-
pean Commission that ‘‘a careful examination of ... experience should be carried out before
considering any further legislation or other measure at the EU level.’’In the U.S., thoughtful
commentators have begun to question the application of Section 404 with the Committee
on Capital Markets Regulation (2006) calling for a ‘‘risk-based’’ regulation process that
focuses on the costs and beneﬁts of internal control reporting. Even the PCAOB has con-
sidered adjustments to the reporting on internal control as evidenced by the recently pro-
posed Auditing Standard No. 5 which would require a risk-based, process-oriented approach
to internal control evaluation and would remove the auditor’s report on management’s
assessment of internal control (PCAOB 2006). Thus, the question of internal control re-
porting is not yet settled as regulators grapple with the breadth (ﬁnancial reporting versus
COSO-based controls) and depth (rules versus principles based approaches) of internal
control reporting.
Our ﬁndings provide support for subsequent governance reforms in The Netherlands
(and other jurisdictions) that favor a principles-based, nonprescriptive approach to internal
control reporting. A principles-based approach to business-based controls better recognizes
the need of ﬁrms to tailor internal control systems and reports to suit their speciﬁc envi-
ronments. The broad scope is considered useful by both management and investors since
the broader range of risks that are considered reﬂect the major determinants of a company’s
soundness (Monitoring Committee Corporate Governance Code 2005). Our results suggest
that requiring managers to make internal control disclosures that they would not make
voluntarily, may force them to incur additional costs that can decrease ﬁrm value. This may
particularly apply to a mandated statement on the (in)effectiveness of internal controls since
our analysis shows that managers generally prefer to report on the existence of internal
controls, as opposed to their effectiveness. A particular concern of regulators may be that
the overall level of voluntary internal control disclosure is ‘‘not sufﬁcient.’’ In a voluntary
setting, as opposed to a mandatory setting, managers can (and do) choose to not disclose
‘‘unfavorable’’ information about internal control (e.g., weaknesses). However, this may be
economically efﬁcient because investors, who expect full disclosure, can infer the worst
from nondisclosure and require a higher risk premium. Consequently, if managers choose
not to disclose, the beneﬁts of lowering the risk premium may not outweigh the cost of
making the disclosure.
Our paper is subject to possible limitations. First, as discussed in detail, there may be
various measurement issues related to ICD and other variables. Furthermore, our measure
of ﬁnancial leverage proxies for agency problems between shareholders and debt holders.
However, we cannot distinguish private debt (bank loans) from public debt (corporate
bonds). This distinction may be relevant because Dutch banks play an active role in mon-
itoring management (De Haan and Hinloopen 2003; Krishnaswami et al. 1999). Conse-
quently, the demand for internal control disclosure from private debt holders may be lower60 Deumes and Knechel
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than the demand from public debt holders. Third, our proxy for ownership concentration
reﬂects agency problems between managers and shareholders. While block holder moni-
toring decreases information asymmetry and agency problems between managers and share-
holders (as we argue), conﬂicts between block holders and small shareholders may increase
at the same time, possibly affecting management’s incentive to disclose. Finally, the pos-
sibility arises that at least some ﬁrms simply included ‘‘boiler plate’’ terminology in their
reports to create the appearance that they were following best practices of the time. Future
research might address these limitations in detail and address related issues such as bal-
ancing a focus on ﬁnancial reporting and the business necessity of controlling a broader
set of risks, the appropriate balance between rules and principles based regulation, and the
role of the auditor in evaluating internal control disclosures. Such research could explicitly
examine the effects of the changing institutions and regulatory regimes of the past few
years.
APPENDIX
ELEMENTS OF INTERNAL CONTROL DISCLOSURE INDEX (ICD)
● Item 1: The Peters Committee (1997) recommended that at least once a year the
supervisory board should discuss the results of the executive directors’ assessment
of internal control. The fact that such a discussion has been held (but not necessarily
the content of the discussion) should be mentioned in the supervisory board’s report
included in the ﬁrm’s annual report.
Item 1 takes a value of one if the report discloses that the supervisory committee
discussed internal control.
Examples of disclosures for Item 1 include: ‘‘in our meetings attention was paid to
the internal control system’’ or ‘‘in the presence of the external auditor, the internal
control system was discussed.’’ In The Netherlands, the supervisory board is a vital
corporate governance mechanism that monitors management. By reporting on this
item, the supervisory board can inform investors that it also has an eye for manage-
ments’ activities with respect to internal control. It was one of the few recommen-
dations made on internal control reporting by the Dutch corporate governance com-
mittee. Reporting this item truthfully is not cost-free as it requires the supervisory
board to acquire the information necessary to assess internal controls, and discuss
this information in their meetings. Managers, in turn, will likely make more invest-
ments in internal control so as to not look bad to the supervisory board.
● Item 2: COSO (1992) recommended that management report whether a system has
been established to achieve the objectives of internal control.
Item 2 takes a value of one if the management board states the objectives of their
ﬁrm’s internal control system in the annual report.
Reported objectives of internal control include managing risk associated with busi-
ness activities, controlling the effectiveness and efﬁciency of business activities, safe-
guarding assets, complying with laws and regulation, and providing reliable reports.
It is unclear beforehand whether this information is relevant for ﬁnancial statement
users, i.e., helps them monitor management. General objectives of internal control
may be evident for example to anyone familiar with the COSO report. It is also
unclear why this item is costly for ﬁrms to disclose.
● Item 3: COSO (1992), the Cadbury Committee (1992a), the Hampel Committee
(1998a), and the Turnbull Committee (1999) have all emphasized management’sEconomic Incentives for Voluntary Internal Control Reporting 61
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responsibilities for internal control and recommended that management report on
those responsibilities.
Item 3 takes a value of one if management acknowledges its responsibility for internal
control in the annual report.
Most ﬁrms reporting on this item stated that ‘‘management is responsible for the
functioning of the internal control system.’’ Again, one can question how much
information this statement conveys to users of ﬁnancial statements. After all, man-
agement is responsible for internal control by default. Nevertheless, being respon-
sible and taking responsibility may differ notably in this context. Investors may
perceive for example that management puts its reputation at stake by taking blame
beforehand for potential mistakes and fraudulent behavior of subordinates that could
have been prevented by adequate internal controls.
● Item 4: COSO (1992), the Cadbury Committee (1992a) and the Hampel Committee
(1998a) recommended that directors report on the effectiveness of the ﬁrm’s system
of internal control.
Item 4 takes a value of one if directors give an opinion on the effectiveness of internal
control.
Generally, ﬁrms reporting on Item 4 stated that ‘‘the management board considers
the internal control system to be adequate’’ or ‘‘the system provides reasonable
assurance,’’ without addressing the criteria for those assessments.22 Despite inherent
limitations of internal control and uncertainty about the criteria used for the evalu-
ation of internal controls, this item is likely informative for ﬁnancial statement users.
The Tabaksblat Committee (2003) nowadays strongly encourages reporting on this
item. Disclosure is costly due to the need to collect and evaluate information nec-
essary to assess internal controls. Additionally, managers put their reputation at stake
and risk incurring litigation costs when internal controls fail afterwards in detecting
errors or employee fraud.
● Item 5: The Turnbull Committee (1999) and COSO (1992) recommended reporting
about internal auditing to indicate how management monitors internal control.
Item 5 has a value of one if the annual report describes the role of internal auditing
in the ﬁrm.
Typically, ﬁrms make statements similar to: ‘‘the internal auditors monitor the in-
ternal control system and report their ﬁndings to the management board.’’ Part of
the function of the internal auditor is to monitor internal controls. Nevertheless, this
item is likely informative to ﬁnancial statement users because internal auditing de-
partments are not common in Dutch ﬁrms and it is difﬁcult for them to ﬁnd out
which ﬁrms have an internal auditing department and which ﬁrms don’t. Because of
22 None of the ﬁrms that at least once report on Item 4 explicitly state that internal controls are ineffective. Two
ﬁrms though explicitly point out weaknesses, while at the same time considering internal controls on the whole
to be adequate. One ﬁrm reported that it started to perform internal audits during 1997 and that these audits
pointed to signiﬁcant improvements in internal controls in 1997 and 1998. In 1999 this ﬁrm reported that no
major weaknesses in the internal control systems were found. While none of the ﬁrms reporting on Item 4 state
a best practice framework used to evaluate internal controls (e.g., COSO), most specify the purpose and nature
of internal controls. Virtually all ﬁrms associate internal control with risk management and about half of ﬁrms
state that their internal control system is designed to monitor the effectiveness and efﬁciency of operations,
safeguard assets, or ensure compliance with rules and regulations.62 Deumes and Knechel
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the wide range of internal auditing practices, reporting this item may reassure in-
vestors that management adequately invests in internal auditing.
● Item 6: COSO (1992) identiﬁes risk assessment as an important component of in-
ternal control and the Turnbull Committee (1999) mentions that internal control
should include an on-going process for identifying, evaluating, and managing risk.
The Peters Committee (1997) recommended that the main mechanisms to control
risk should be a permanent part of the annual report.
Item 6 has a value of one if a ﬁrm discloses speciﬁc risk management activities.
Typically, ﬁrms mentioned activities to transfer risk (e.g., through derivatives or
insurance), activities to share risk (e.g., via alliances or pricing), policies and pro-
cedures to mitigate risk (e.g., credit checks or centralized approvals), and activities
to avoid risk (e.g., avoiding interest rate risk by borrowing in local currencies).
Together with Item 1, it was the only recommendation made on internal control
reporting by the Dutch corporate governance committee. A potential cost of reporting
this item is the cost of revealing proprietary information to competitors, who may
exploit information on speciﬁc risk management activities to the detriment of the
disclosing ﬁrm.
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